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In the Shadow of the War: Bolshevik Perceptions of Polish Subversive and 





This article examines Soviet perceptions of subversive and military threats from 
Poland to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and early 1930s. Drawing on archival 
materials from the Soviet foreign ministry, Communist Party leadership and security 
organs, it shows how the Soviet leadership held exaggerated fears about Polish threats 
to the Soviet western border regions and military intervention. A pattern of 
misperception stemmed from the Bolshevik defeat to Poland in the 1919-1920 Soviet-
Polish War, which rather than moderating the early Soviet regime ultimately 
encouraged more widespread use of state violence and provided further rationale for 
Stalin’s ‘Revolution from Above’. 
 




At the end of the 1920s and early 1930s, Iosif Stalin and his inner circle were 
increasingly preoccupied with a potential military threat from Poland and the security 
of the Soviet Union’s western border regions. The vulnerability of Soviet Ukraine was 
a special point of concern. On 11 August 1932, Stalin fired off a telegram to his close 
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ally Lazar Kaganovich warning of the risk of losing Ukraine to Poland. Highly critical 
of the local communist leadership, Stalin claimed that Polish subversives had 
infiltrated the party ranks and were taking advantage of ground-level discontents 
caused by the ongoing collectivisation drive. Stalin wanted new people brought into 
leadership positions, arguing that the Poles might open ‘a front inside (and outside) 
the party, against the party’ if the situation went from bad to worse.1 Two years 
earlier, in September 1930, Stalin had expressed similar concerns to another close 
ally, Viacheslav Molotov, this time about the possible invasion of the Soviet Union by 
Poland and a coalition of hostile states.2 During these same years, the Soviet political 
police amassed enormous files from investigations into Polish subversive operations 
that its agents claimed were active in Ukraine and coordinated by the Polish Military 
Organisation (POV). These supposed conspiracies apparently had the common goal of 
preparing the ground for an invasion that would see Ukraine passed from Soviet to 
Polish control. 
Security anxieties about Polish subversion, the vulnerability of Ukraine and a 
possible invasion spearheaded by Poland had significant impact on the Soviet 
leadership in the 1920s. Perceived Polish subversive and military threats helped 
crystallise concerns about the international dangers facing the Soviet Union and 
cemented fears about a new war among the party elite. These security fears in turn 
emboldened the political police to launch widespread – and spurious – investigations 
into the POV in Ukraine. By the late 1920s, the OGPU was claiming that the POV 
planned to overthrow Soviet power in the republic and that preparations for war were 
continuous. Even though the POV was in fact long-defunct, the OGPU produced 
																																																								
1 O. V. Khlevniuk et al. (eds.), Stalin i Kaganovich perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. (Moscow: Rosspen, 
2001) 273-274.  
2 Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov and Oleg V. Khlevniuk (eds.), Stalin’s Letters to Molotov: 1925-1936 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 208.	
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masses of documentation on its supposed plots.3 Soon enough, the Soviet leadership 
would sanction increasingly radical countermeasures to protect the western regions 
from being subverted, including mass deportations. 
In reality there was no credible military danger to the Soviet Union from 
Poland in the 1920s even after Józef Piłsudski returned to power in May 1926 through 
a coup d’état. The Soviet leadership was convinced otherwise for four key reasons. 
First, Stalin and his inner circle held a view of international affairs that judged the 
Soviet Union as encircled by hostile capitalist powers committed to its destruction; 
second, the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the disastrous collapse of their offensive at 
the height of the Soviet-Polish War in summer 1920 had lasting impact; third, the 
vulnerability of the western border regions, and Ukraine in particular, solidified the 
credibility of a Polish threat; fourth, the Soviet political police (GPU/OGPU) sounded 
the alarm about subversive Polish threats to the western border regions – dangers 
supposedly foreshadowing a future invasion – unremittingly throughout the decade.  
Recent research has underlined the centrality of the Soviet borderlands to 
Stalin’s wider security policies.4 That the use of Soviet state violence in the interwar 
period overlapped with heightened concerns within Stalin’s circle about foreign 
threats has also been recently demonstrated.5 This article, however, will underline 
how perceived Polish subversive and military threats not only became priority issues 
for the Soviet leadership in the 1920s and early 1930s, but contributed to the 
trajectory of the early Soviet state during this crucial transitional period. Not least, 
																																																								
3 Numerous such reports about Polish subversion and the POV can be found in the Archive of the State 
Security Services of Ukraine. See for instance, Derzhavnyi haluzevyi arkhiv sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny 
(hereafter DHASBU), especially f. 13. 
4 Alfred J. Rieber, Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
5 David Shearer, ‘Stalin at War, 1918-1953: Patterns of Violence and Foreign Threat’, Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas 66/2 (2018) 188-217. 
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fears about Poland were inseparable from the decision to launch industrialisation, and 
with it the subsequent collectivisation of agriculture.6 Moreover, the Soviet 
leadership’s perception of an existential threat from Poland and supporting capitalist 
countries throughout the 1920s and early 1930s encouraged the type of hard-line 
measures in the western border regions that foreshadowed the more extensive political 
violence of the late 1930s.  
In the short-term, Polish victory in the 1919-20 war has been described as 
having an moderating effect on the early Bolshevik regime, in terms of providing 
further impetus behind the launch of the New Economic Policy, central to economic 
recovery after the civil war, and in pressuring the Bolsheviks to adapt to their 
international isolation with pragmatism in trade policy and diplomatic relations.7 
While much of this remains true, this article will show that in the longer-term the 
opposite of moderation actually occurred. The Bolsheviks frequent misperception of 
the threat from Poland after the Soviet-Polish War, first stemming from a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the defeat, encouraged heightened fears about 
military and subversive dangers. A siege mentality quickly took hold. Above all, this 
provided further rationale for the radical transformation of the Soviet state in the late 
1920s and, in the end, justified the increasing use of state violence. 
 
The Aftermath of War and the Threat from Polish Subversion 
																																																								
6 The importance of the connection between the worsening international climate and the launch of 
industrialisation has previously been drawn by scholars, however, not specifically highlighting the 
centrality of the perceived Polish military threat to the Soviet Union in the 1920s. See for instance, R. 
W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-30 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1980) 37. See also David. R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet 
Union, 1926-1933 (University Press of Kansas, 2000); Lennart Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War 
Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925-1941 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000).	
7 For this suggestion see a classic work on the Soviet-Polish War, Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red 




To understand why such a fearful view of Poland gained currency among Stalin’s 
circle by the end of the 1920s and early 1930s, it is necessary to go back to immediate 
aftermath of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-20. Vladimir Lenin had hoped to use the 
war as a means of spreading revolution to the industrialised countries of Western 
Europe. This was regarded as critical to the survival of the October Revolution, which 
had unexpectedly taken root in Russia. The Bolsheviks were convinced that they 
would not last long without other international socialist allies. Yet the war against 
Poland was nothing short of a disaster. The Red Army’s rapid and overstretched 
offensive towards Warsaw failed spectacularly in August 1920 and the counterattack 
by the Polish military was a blow from which there was no recovery. Critically, 
however, the Bolsheviks attributed this stunning defeat not solely to Polish military 
power or to their own strategic errors. They placed as much blame with the British 
and French governments, whom they believed had closely coordinated the war 
behind-the-scenes. Both governments had given differing amounts of material 
assistance to the Poles in 1920 (totalling no small contribution), but the Bolsheviks 
downplayed Polish agency while exaggerating the involvement of the Entente powers 
in the war. More often than not, Poland was characterised as a pawn in a worldwide 
capitalist conspiracy against the revolution.8 As we shall see, this became an 
entrenched pattern of thinking in party circles. 
The armistice of October 1920 and subsequent peace negotiations between 
Soviet Russia and Poland did little to improve relations. Even after the Treaty of Riga 
was signed on 18 March 1921, mutual distrust and diplomatic tensions continued 
																																																								
8 Leon Trotsky frequently accused the Entente of driving Poland into war against Soviet Russia in his 
public speeches in 1920. See How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon 




unabated, especially concerning the border regions. For the Bolsheviks, and especially 
the Soviet political police, the Cheka, ongoing Polish subversion and infiltration of 
the western borderlands was a pressing issue. In the final months of 1920 Cheka 
agents reported at regular intervals on the activity of Polish spies, subversives and 
bandits, apparently supported by the Polish government and other hostile powers. At 
the end of 1920, Cheka agents judged the demarcation zone between Russia and 
Poland in the west as a hotspot of bandit activity.9  
The Cheka’s attentions focused on the Polish Military Organisation (POV), 
originally created by Piłsudski during the First World War to carry out sabotage and 
intelligence operations. The POV remained active in the western border regions until 
1921 and, as far as the Cheka was concerned, represented a serious threat. Reports 
from Cheka operatives from early 1921 describe an apparent infiltration by the POV 
in Ukraine’s major cities, with groups unearthed in Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Volyn, 
among other places.10 Polish agents were said to have coordinated espionage and 
planned uprisings to disrupt the Soviet rear.11 In response, the Cheka carried out a 
series of operations from the end of 1920 and claimed major successes. The deputy of 
the Cheka’s Special Departments on the southwestern front, for instance, confidently 
reported to Cheka leader, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, at the end of November 1920 about the 
crushing of POV organisations in the Kharkov, Poltava, Pavlograd and 
Aleksandrovsk regions.12 
																																																								
9 A. Berelovich and V. Danilov (eds.), Sovetskaia derevnaia glaszami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. 1918-
1939. Dokumenty i materialy. t. 1. 1918-1922 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000) 363-379. 
10 S. A. Kokin, R. Iu. Podkur and O. S. Rubl’ov (eds.), Sprava “Pol’s’koi Organizatsii Viis’kovoi” v 
Ukraini. 1920-1938 rr.: Zbirnykh dokumentiv ta materialiv (Kyiv: Holovna redkolehiia naukovo-
dokumental’noi serii knyh “Reabilitovani istoriieiu”, 2011) 42 




Despite these successes, there was no end to calls for further action to be taken 
against Polish subversives and spies.13 Complaints about bandit activity in the border 
regions, with Polish support, did not subside either.14 A likely reason behind the 
continuing focus on the border regions were Soviet reports that foreign powers were 
still financing hostile subversive operations. Indeed, in January 1921, a report from 
the Kiev military district claimed that the Polish government was planning to send 
600 agents to Ukraine and that the Entente was involved.15 Later in June, Artur 
Artuzov, deputy head of the Cheka’s Special Departments, reported to the Red Army 
leadership about operations carried out against anti-Soviet organisations headed by 
Russian counterrevolutionary Boris Savinkov. Savinkov had connections in Warsaw, 
but according to Artuzov, he also received funds from the Entente. As to the nature of 
the threat, Artuzov reported a familiar story: Savinkov’s groups planned uprisings in 
Soviet territory, including the seizure of transport and communication points. The Red 
Army had supposedly been infiltrated. In the end, numerous arrests were made in the 
course of the Cheka’s counter operations.16  
Across the board in 1921, the Cheka claimed new discoveries of subversive 
groups and launched further investigations into POV activity in Ukraine.17 In June, to 
																																																								
13 A. A. Plekhanov and A. M. Plekhanov (eds.), F. E. Dzerzhinskii – Predsedatel' VChK–OGPU, 
1917–1926. Dokumenty (Moscow: MFD: Materik, 2007) 258. 
14 In April Dzerzhinskii instructed his subordinates to collect more information about the role of 
Poland, Romania and other powers in financing banditism. Viktor Chebrikov, Istoriia sovetskikh 
organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: uchebnik. (Moscow: KGB, 1977) 174. See also Plekhanov and 
Plekhanov (eds.), F. E. Dzerzhinskii, 295. 
15 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI), f. 17, op. 109, 
d. 137, l. 1.		
16 Aleksandr Zdanovich, Pol’skii krest sovetskoi kontrrazvedki: pol’skaia liniia v rabote VChK-NKVD 
1918-1938 (Moskva: Kraft+, 2017) 332-334 
17 See investigation of the POV in Kharkov in March 1921, Kokin, Podkur and Rubl’ov (eds.), Sprava 
“Pol’s’koi Organizatsii Viis’kovoi” v Ukraini. 59; an investigation in an organisation in May 1921, 
Chebrikov, Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 171; an investigation from June 
1921, Berelovich and Danilov (eds.), Sovetskaia derevnaia glaszami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. t. 1, 449. 
On the Cheka’s wider successes against insurgents in Ukraine in 1921, see Jan Jacek Bruski, Between 
Prometheism and Realpolitik. Poland and Soviet Ukraine, 1921-1926 (Krakow: Jagiellonian University 
Press, 2016) 102. 
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support these efforts, the Communist Party of Ukraine called for the mobilisation of 
Poles into the Ukrainian Cheka.18 In August, the central Cheka leadership ordered that 
the western borders be strengthened.19 Evidently, despite the official peace with 
Poland enshrined in the Treaty of Riga – and the supposed crushing of the POV in 
early 1921 – there had been little reduction in Soviet concerns about Polish 
subversion. 
The Soviet foreign ministry likewise saw Polish subversion of the western 
borderlands and Ukraine as a pressing problem. However, Soviet diplomats also 
recognised the risk of needlessly worsening diplomatic relations when the Treaty of 
Riga had only just been agreed. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgii 
Chicherin, was mindful about restoring relations with Poland to help the struggling 
Soviet economy. He tended to downplay talk of a new war and emphasised instead 
the importance of creating lines of trade. In a letter to the Politburo from September 
1921, for instance, Chicherin argued that there was no threat of another conflict with 
Poland and that the biggest danger was diplomatic rupture that would destroy the 
chance of securing transit rights.20  
Moreover, rather than present a one-sided picture of Polish hostility or the 
country as manipulated by the Entente, Soviet diplomats reported throughout 1921 on 
the Polish government’s resistance to French efforts to exert control over its foreign 
policy. These reports made the repeated point that the French government had 
abandoned efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks. The French aimed instead to create a 
																																																								
18 Iu. Shapoval, V. Prystaiko, and V. Zolotar'ov (eds.), ChK –GPU–NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, fakty, 
dokumenty (Kyiv: Abris,1997) 226.	
19 Plekhanov and Plekhanov (eds.), F. E. Dzerzhinskii, 334. 




barrier against the spread of Bolshevism, comprising Poland and the Little Entente.21 
Soviet diplomats in general terms had a more nuanced understanding of the Polish 
government’s relationship with the Entente and appreciated its reluctance to be drawn 
into anti-Soviet actions it could not afford to sustain. This was in striking contrast to 
the perspective held by the Cheka, which saw the Entente as working hand-in-hand 
with Poland in carrying out subversive anti-Soviet operations in advance of an 
invasion. The differing judgements could spark tensions between the two. In July 
1921, the foreign ministry protested to the Central Committee about the Cheka’s 
increased policing of the western borders as an unnecessary complication in Soviet-
Polish relations.22 Even so, despite looking to improve diplomatic and trade 
relationships, Chicherin nevertheless took a firm stance against Polish-sponsored 
bandit activity in the western border regions and this was a common complaint in 
diplomatic notes to the Polish government in the early 1920s, especially as 
information about subversive organisations with connections to Poland filtered in.23 
Like the foreign ministry, Soviet military intelligence was less concerned than 
the Cheka about the threat from Poland in the early 1920s. It rightly recognised that 
the Poles could not launch a war without major assistance from more powerful 
countries and that this would be an unpopular move at home. However, military 
																																																								
21 AVPRF, f. 4, op. 32, d. 52482, p. 209, l. 49. On reports that France showed willingness to 
acknowledge the Soviet government, see f. 4, op. 32, d. 52482, p. 209, ll. 55-56. It must be noted, 
however, that some reports to Chicherin did underline the possibility that France would try to push 
Poland and Romania into war against Soviet Russia, but this went against the grain of the majority of 
diplomatic communications. See AVPRF, f. 4, op. 32, d. 52482, p. 209, l. 60. On French plans for 
buffer states in Eastern Europe, see AVPRF, f. 4, op. 32, d. 52511, p. 210, l. 13. 
22 AVPRF, f. 4, op. 52 d. 55273, p. 341, ll. 12-13. 	
23 Among many examples, see Bruski, Between Prometheism and Realpolitik, 122; Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (hereafter RGVA), f. 33987, d. 1, d. 460, ll. 68, 71; Tsentral’nyi 
derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukraïny (hereafter TsDAVO), f. 4, op. 1, d. 
29, l. 26. Berelovich and Danilov (eds.), Sovetskaia derevnaia glaszami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. t. 1, 449. 
The threat of war was raised by Soviet diplomats as part of protests against Polish-sponsored 
banditism. Soviet diplomats in Ukraine, for instance, complained to their Polish counterparts that they 
would not consider the Treaty of Riga fulfilled unless those trying to start war (the Polish government 
in sponsoring banditism) were stopped. TsDAVO, f. 4, op. 1c, d. 31, l. 3. 
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intelligence still judged Polish support of anti-Soviet groups in threatening terms and 
as one part of Piłsudski’s long-term scheme to bring Lithuania, Belorussia and 
Ukraine into closer union with Poland as buffer states. Moreover, despite not 
estimating war as imminent, military intelligence still accepted that major conflict 
between Soviet Russia and Poland was inevitable at some point in the future (and that 
the latter was actively preparing for this).24 In this respect, even though there were 
different judgements on the severity of the Polish military threat between these Soviet 
institutions, all continued to see the subversion of Soviet territory as a persisting 
problem. Ongoing tensions surrounding the Polish government’s support of guerrilla 
groups in the border regions only added fuel to the fire. And among competing 
appraisals about the imminence of new war, the Cheka continued to push the most 
alarmist scenarios. 
The Soviet and Polish governments soon struck agreements ostensibly ending 
Polish support of anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine and the border regions on the 
condition that the Bolsheviks fulfil the Treaty of Riga (namely, pay any gold 
promised to Poland and allow re-evacuation commissions to start work).25 However, 
this agreement, formalised in the Dąbski-Karakhan protocol of 7 October 1921, 
quickly floundered. Just eight days later, Special Plenipotentiary to Poland, Lev 
Karakhan was again complaining to Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konstanty 
Skirmunt, that Savinkov was still in Poland.26 The Soviet Ukrainian government also 
complained about persistent anti-Soviet activities of other Ukrainian nationalist 
leaders, including Symon Petliura and Stanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz and called on the 
																																																								
24 Plekhanov and Plekhanov (eds.), F. E. Dzerzhinskii, 344-5; M. Ul', V. Khaustov and V. Zakharov 
(eds.), Glazami razvedki. SSSR i Evropa, 1919-1938 gody: sbornik dokumentov iz rossiiskikh arkhivov 
(Moscow: ISTLIT, 2015) 83-89; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 2422, l. 15. 
25 Bruski, Between Prometheism and Realpolitik, 127. 
26 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. t. 4 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960) 430. 
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Polish government to take action.27 Then in November, Yuriy Tiutiunnik, leader of 
the so-called Ukrainian National Army, launched an insurgent operation into Soviet 
territory. Soviet troops easily quashed Tiutiunnik’s forces, but the affair did little to 
inspire confidence that the Poles were living up to their side of the bargain.28 Indeed, 
the Bolsheviks claimed to have documents revealing Polish support given to 
Tiutiunnik and the existence of a Polish espionage network in Ukraine.29 The Soviet 
political police later went on to report further discoveries of anti-Soviet groups 
coming from Polish territory and spy networks, apparently supported by Poland, in 
1922 and 1923.30 The Bolsheviks, of course, were hardly innocent in this. Soviet 
support was given to guerrilla groups in the contested border regions, especially in 
Galicia, prompting complaints from the Polish government and further souring 
relations.31  
 To further combat Polish subversion, the Bolshevik Polish Bureau, responsible 
for agitation and education among Poles living in Soviet territory, increased its 
activity. The Polish Bureau had previously argued that more attention be given to the 
borderlands in view of the large Polish populations and entrenched Catholicism.32 In 
1922, thousands more newspapers and propaganda brochures were now printed.33 Yet 
in early 1923, the Polish Bureau was still identifying problems, claiming that 
counterrevolutionary activity remained a serious threat in the borderlands. The 
																																																								
27 Ibid., 452. 
28 Bruski, Between Prometheism and Realpolitik, 128. 
29 TsDAVO, f. 4, op. 1c, d. 31, l. 3; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. t. 4, 529. 
30 See G. N. Sevost’ianov et al. (eds.) “Sovershenno Sekretno”: Lubianka Stalinu o polozhenii v strane 
(1922-1934 gg.) t. 1, ch. 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 2001) 163, 302, 358, 372; ibid., t. 1. ch. 2, 788, 928, 947; 
ibid., t. 2, ch, 1, 69; ibid., t. 3, 247. 
31	AVPRF, f. 122, op. 5, d. 4, p. 20, ll. 50-53. In autumn 1922, relations between Russia and Poland 
worsened because of the Soviet support given to guerrilla groups in Galicia. Polish troops were 
subsequently deployed. Bruski, Between Prometheism and Realpolitik, 198-199. See also RGVA, f. 
33988, op. 2, d. 533, l. 326. 
32 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 1631, l. 1.  
33 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 2426, l. 20. 
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majority of Polish schools had apparently fallen under counterrevolutionary 
influences.34 It expressed alarm in particular about the activity of catholic priests, 
characterised as becoming ‘more secret, more planned and consequently more 
dangerous’.35 On a certain level, the Polish Bureau was probably lobbying for funding 
in making these claims: it argued that wherever its presence was not felt, there had 
been a rise in counterrevolutionary activity.36 But it was not alone in raising the 
alarm. The political police reported a similar picture: that Polish populations in the 
western regions remained hostile to Soviet power and rumours were being spread 
about an imminent Polish invasion.37 Yet their response was unsurprisingly more 
hard-line. In March 1923, on the basis of worsening relations with Poland during the 
revolutionary crisis in Germany, the west and southwestern border regions were 
purged of ‘harmful elements’ that might support enemies of Soviet power. Poles were 
specifically targeted.38 At the end of 1923, factories close to the border employing 
Polish workers were scrutinised after being judged focal points for 
counterrevolutionary activity.39 Supposed Polish counterrevolutionary groups were 
also rounded up. Foreshadowing the more extensive investigations of the late 1920s, 
the Ukrainian GPU uncovered what it claimed to be another Polish Military 
Organisation connected to the Polish diplomatic missions in Kiev and other cities, 
totalling around 400 people.40  
																																																								
34 RGASPI, f. 63, op. 1, d. 554, l. 17. 
35 RGASPI, f. 63, op. 1, d. 363, l. 57. 
36 RGASPI, f. 63, op. 1, d. 360, l. 1; d. 363, ll. 22-25. 
37 Sevost’ianov et al. (eds.), “Sovershenno Sekretno”: Lubianka Stalinu o polozhenii v strane, t. 1, ch. 
1, 230. For general war rumours among ordinary people, see ibid., t. 1, ch. 2, 613, 808. The political 
police noted that the closer to the Romanian and Polish borders, the more numerous and better-armed 
the bandit groups. See ibid., t. 1, ch. 1, 177.		
38 A. A. Kol’tiukov et al. (eds.), Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh- 40-kh godov XX v.; Dokumenty i 
materialy, t. 4 (Moscow: RGGU, 2007) 808. 
39 TsDAVO, f. 2, op. 2, d. 905, ll. 1, 6. 
40 DHASBU, f. 13, ark. 162, t. 8, ll. 2-6. 
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The political police would claim further victories as it turned greater attention 
to tackling Polish subversion. By autumn 1923, the Ukrainian GPU reported on 
having almost completely eliminated organisations headed by Petliura, Tiutiunik and 
Savinkov, all of whom had received Polish backing. Its operatives made further 
‘discoveries’ of supposed Polish espionage organisations apparently working together 
with French counterintelligence.41 It must be stressed that these were not totally 
imaginary threats. The Polish government did sponsor anti-Soviet activity in the 
borderlands. The Polish Second Department, responsible for intelligence, ran 
operations under the cover of Polish diplomatic representation. It also maintained 
contacts with anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine, often without the knowledge of the 
Polish government.42 But the Bolsheviks overestimated the scale of the threat. In early 
1925, for instance, Polish intelligence officials reported on ninety Poles and 
Ukrainians arrested in Ukraine for their political views or anti-Soviet activities. The 
Soviet authorities had accused ninety per cent of espionage. Yet Polish intelligence 
regarded less than half of these charges as accurate.43 Polish intelligence was 
undoubtedly active in Ukraine in the 1920s, but the formal charges of espionage 
levelled in this case were over twice as high. 
Taken together, the events of the early 1920s should have given some pause 
for thought within the Soviet leadership and security apparatus about the nature of 
Polish subversive and military threats. As we have seen, the Cheka had already 
claimed a series of victories against the POV in 1920 and 1921; agreements had been 
struck (however imperfectly) between the Soviet and Polish governments on ending 
																																																								
41 RGASPI, f, 17, op. 87, d. 177, ll. 89-129. 
42 In February 1924, Polish intelligence reported on its connections to an anti-Soviet group comprising 
1600 active members, the leaders of which were former tsarist officers. RGVA, f. 308, op. 3, d. 39, l. 
61. 




support of guerrilla organisations; the Soviet foreign ministry expressed frequent 
doubts about Polish military aggression in the early 1920s. Even the most dramatic 
international event of this period, the revolutionary crisis in Germany in 1923, failed 
to spark war between Soviet Russia and Poland as predicted by several senior 
Bolsheviks.44 The Polish government went on to formally recognise the Soviet Union 
at the end of 1923.  
Yet rather than change minds on the nature of the Polish threat, the opposite 
occurred. Polish subversive threats continued to be presented in heightened terms and 
countermeasures were stepped up from 1924. The Polish consulate in Kiev, for 
instance, reported on intensified GPU surveillance in early 1924 and judged this 
‘feverish activity’ as accelerated from the Soviet centre.45 In April 1924, Dzerzhinskii 
called for more vigilance against spies from Poland, Romania, Latvia and Estonia.46 
Soviet Military intelligence pointed to higher levels of Polish-supported bandit 
activity in 1924 and efforts to foment anti-Soviet moods in the border regions.47 In 
June, the Politburo called for stronger defence of the border regions and enhanced the 
OGPU’s presence.48 It was given almost four million rubles to improve border 
security in July 1925. The perceived military threat was never far behind. For 
instance, claiming that Ukraine would be the bridgehead in a war between Poland, 
Romania and the Soviet Union, Stalin’s ally, Lazar Kaganovich, called in June 1925 
for stronger counter-diversionary work by the Ukrainian GPU during a meeting of the 
Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine.49 These security fears were a legacy of 
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the disastrous war against Poland a few years earlier, sustained by what the 
Bolsheviks took to be an ongoing battle against Polish subversion, regarded by many 
as the first step towards all-out military conflict.50 
The reality was that the efforts of the Polish Second Department were limited 
without formal support from the Polish government; the POV was no longer active, 
and there was no chance of an invasion of the Soviet Union in the 1920s. In this way, 
the Bolsheviks overestimated the true nature of the Polish threat. It was not until 
Piłsudski returned to power in Poland in May 1926 that serious thought was given in 
Polish political circles to liberating Ukraine, and even so, war still remained a distant 
possibility.51 
  
The Piłsudski coup d’état  
 
As far as the Soviet leadership was concerned, Piłsudski’s return to power in May 
1926 heightened the Polish military threat to the Soviet Union and especially to the 
western border regions. Piłsudski was a long-standing proponent of creating a 
federation of borderland states under Polish control. For this reason, the leadership 
was deeply concerned about his return to power, which contributed to a war scare that 
erupted across the Soviet Union in 1927. Moreover, in the months leading up to the 
May 1926 coup d’état, there had been no respite in warnings from the OGPU about 
the pressing danger of Polish subversion. For example, in April second deputy of the 
OGPU, Genrikh Iagoda, wrote to Stalin about Polish intelligence agents supposedly 
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working on the orders of the British government and carrying out a widespread 
diversionary campaign on Soviet territory.52 Dzerzhinskii suggested in the same 
month that Poles not be employed in the most important sectors of the economy.53  
Following Piłsudski’s return to power, the OGPU reported an increase in 
Polish espionage across the board.54 Ominously, it also judged his return as giving a 
boost to Ukrainian nationalists – now styled as potential fifth columnists.55 In July 
1926, OGPU leaders decided to concentrate efforts on the renewed Polish threat to the 
western borderlands and to work with military intelligence in preparing for war. 
Dzerzhinskii also personally impressed upon Stalin what he saw as the stark reality of 
the military threat, warning that Piłsudski was planning to seize Belarussia and 
Ukraine.56 Notably, the political police argued that the British government was 
supporting these efforts.57 Throughout July – the last month Dzerzhinskii’s life – he 
maintained focus on the military danger from Poland. To Iagoda, he suggested 
moving political police archives to Moscow as they lay too close to the increasingly 
threatened border. Whiteguards and bandits also needed to be excised from the area.58 
An OGPU order from 17 July called once gain for Poles to be removed from work in 
military industry.59 Just days before he died, Dzerzhinskii was raising questions about 
diversionary groups and the importing of necessary defence materiel in the event of 
war.60 Yet in contrast to the early 1920s, Dzerzhinskii was no longer such an outlier in 
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worrying about new war. On 12 July, a meeting of political police, foreign ministry 
and military leaders all agreed that the threat of war had significantly increased with 
Piłsudski’s return to power.61 
 Individuals within the Soviet foreign ministry now appraised the threat of 
Polish attack more seriously. In notes sent to Stalin on 25 July 1926, Semion Aralov, 
founder of Soviet military intelligence and member of the Collegium of the People’s 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID), claimed that Piłsudski was carrying out 
preparatory military work for attacks on the borders with the assistance of Ukrainian 
émigré and bandit groups. All of this, once again, was apparently under the guiding 
hand of the British government. Aralov argued that the border regions be strengthened 
(though, he stressed that this not be done too provocatively otherwise war might 
arrive sooner than later). Other priorities, according to Aralov, were the isolation of 
Poland from its Baltic neighbours and the improvement of Soviet-Polish economic 
ties.62 Another leading member of the Collegium, Boris Stomoniakov, in early 1927 
stressed the importance of a public demonstration that Piłsudski’s politics were of 
war, not peace.63 The foreign ministry would soon scramble to secure a non-
aggression pact with Poland; negotiations that failed deliver anything until 1932.  
With tensions running high, the security of the border republics was once 
again on the agenda. In August 1926, war alarm tests were conducted twice in 
Belorussia.64 In early September, the Ukrainian GPU, having evidently tested the 
temperature among the local population, produced a new circular on separatism in the 
republic. Ukrainian separatists, while harbouring some ill-feeling towards Poland, 
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apparently saw the country as their means of achieving their independence.65 The 
political police continued to report on local rumours about a forthcoming war against 
Poland.66 
With concerns about future war rising across several Soviet Commissariats, 
the inadequacy of Soviet defences was becoming increasingly stark. In December 
1926, Red Army Chief of Staff, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, underlined this in a report to 
the Politburo, stating that in terms of mobilisation readiness ‘Neither the Red Army 
nor the country is prepared for war.’67 One month later in January 1927, the Politburo 
discussed convening a secret session in February to examine a report on the threat of 
war – and corresponding plans for war – produced by head of the Red Army, Kliment 
Voroshilov.68 Shortly afterwards, at the February Plenum of the Central Committee, 
Voroshilov spoke about Soviet military preparations, yet was criticised for not 
speaking sufficiently on how all Soviet industry and the economy could be adapted to 
the needs of war.69 Serious thought was evidently being given to future improvements 
in Soviet defences across the board and how to mobilise the entire state for the 
approaching conflict. Yet there were serious challenges and no quick solutions. 
During 1927-28 Soviet intelligence produced The Future War, a study that concluded 
that war in the west against a coalition headed by Poland was the most likely scenario. 
Yet the authors of the report estimated that it would take five to ten years before the 
Red Army had sufficient resources to fight a mobile campaign against Poland.70 And 
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with state budgets constrained, the Red Army had failed to secure the funds that it 
deemed necessary for 1927-28.71 
 Within this growing clamour about a military threat from Poland, it is 
important to note the dissenting voices. While senior figures in the Soviet foreign 
ministry now more strongly expressed concerns about a Polish military threat, deputy 
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maksim Litvinov, held a different view. On 
two separate occasions in early 1927 he argued with Stalin that there was in fact no 
threat of war from Poland and that the country should not be regarded as a ‘plaything’ 
of the west. Litvinov rightly argued there was no reliable information that the British 
government was pushing Poland into war.72 Not all accepted the growing narrative 
about the threat from Piłsudski’s Poland.  
 Stalin was left unconvinced by Litvinov. He saw an international conspiracy 
against the Soviet Union and believed major war inevitable.73 This had become an 
established theme in his public speeches in the second half of the 1920s. Yet 
critically, Stalin doubted the imminence of any conflict. At the Fifteenth Party 
Conference in November 1926, he proclaimed that it was unclear whether capitalist 
powers were yet in the position to launch an attack, even though ‘the capitalists are 
not asleep; they are doing their utmost to weaken the international position of our 
republic and to prepare the way for intervention.’74 Stalin was clearer in March 1927 
that war would not arrive in the immediate future. In a speech given to a meeting of 
railway workers, he remarked: ‘The majority of questions boil down to one: shall we 
have war this year, in the spring or autumn of this year? My reply is that we shall not 
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have war this year, neither in the spring nor in the autumn.’75 Even so, the wider 
danger from the capitalist world remained unaltered. In May, at a Plenum of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International, Stalin proclaimed that a 
‘universal campaign against the Communists’ was already underway.76 This message 
was echoed by Stalin’s close allies. At around the same time, Kaganovich once again 
railed against Piłsudski, accusing him of waging a war ‘against Moscow for the 
attachment of Ukraine to European culture’, remarking that Polish fascism was 
backed by foreign imperialism.77 
In this respect, Stalin’s view about the imminence of war against Poland was 
similar to that held by Soviet military intelligence, who expected rising tension and 
hostility with Poland after Piłsudski’s return to power – and appraised the country as 
the ‘most probable adversary’ in a future war – but did not see conflict breaking out 
imminently, certainly not in 1927.78 Indeed, Stalin was highly critical of the ‘repeated 
prophecies’ of the political opposition (coming from Grigorii Zinoviev in particular) 
which regularly broadcast the imminence the war, something that Stalin labelled as 
the ‘hysterics of our opposition’ in October 1927.79 Yet Stalin’s vision of future war 
was still significantly further away from the likes of Litvinov who had harboured 
doubts about the very nature of the international capitalist conspiracy against Soviet 
power. This was something Stalin was adamant existed. 
It is also clear that the events of mid-1927 further cemented Stalin’s views 
about the prospects of future war. Diplomatic relations with Britain suddenly 
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worsened following the British raid on the Soviet trade delegation and All-Russian 
Cooperative Society in London in May 1927, which the British authorities said 
revealed evidence of Soviet subversive activities. Moreover, the assassination of 
Soviet Special Plenipotentiary to Poland, Petr Voikov, by a White Monarchist a few 
weeks later, concentrated Stalin’s mind on the military threat from Poland and 
Britain. In a letter to Molotov sent on 8 June, the day after the assassination, Stalin 
wrote that he felt the ‘hand of England’ in Voikov’s murder and speculated that the 
British government wanted to spark war between the Soviet Union and Poland.80  
Such a conspiratorial gut reaction was not confined to Stalin and can be seen 
across the wider party and among the Soviet population. On 17 June, the first 
secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia (a republic that would be directly 
threatened by another war with Poland), argued in a secret report that the Voikov 
murder was evidence that ‘England is putting together a bloc of anti-Soviet states, 
particularly states that border the USSR - Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Finland, and 
others, by organizing and supporting fascist, monarchist, and White guard 
organizations and enticing them to attack the USSR.’81 More broadly, during the 
summer, the Polish Bureau reported on the temporary panic sparked by the Voikov 
murder among Polish populations in the border regions.82 It would soon call for 
stronger agitation, especially in the borders, to help explain the current crisis and the 
preparations taken in anticipation of the ‘imperialist war’.83 The Ukrainian GPU 
likewise recorded comments on the ground in the aftermath of the Voikov murder, in 
which comparisons were made to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and reported 
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local concerns about war against Poland and Romania.84 At the same time, the OGPU 
made further ‘discoveries’ of dangerous subversives and spies that supported the 
growing narrative of a joint Polish and British threat. In the same month that Voikov 
was murdered, for instance, the OGPU reported on supposed British espionage carried 
out in Leningrad, where British and Polish agents had apparently recruited saboteurs 
to assist in the forthcoming invasion.85 Even the previously doubtful Litvinov now 
alluded to forces of ‘militant imperialism’ trying to complicate relations between the 
Soviet Union and other countries.86  
Despite all of this, there were still glimpses of a counter-narrative. On 14 June 
1927, N. D. S. Sokolov, a member of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Poland, 
reported that Piłsudski had given assurances there had not been a single attempt by 
the British to push Poland into taking action against the Soviet Union. He wrote that 
Piłsudski in fact expressed interest in the continued existence of the USSR.87 
However, this counter-narrative evidently gained little traction with the Soviet 
leadership and did little to dampen down the perceived threat from Poland in the 
aftermath of the Voikov murder. Indeed, at the same time that these reports were sent 
to Stomoniakov at the foreign ministry, the Soviet government announced a Defence 
Week, involving a series of military manoeuvres. On 27 June, the Politburo decreed 
that head of the government, Aleksei Rykov, raise the question of immediate 
preparations to ‘to further strengthen the country’s defence’.88 
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The ‘Revolution from Above’ 
 
In October 1928 Stalin launched the industrialisation of the Soviet Union, embodied 
in the first Five-Year Plan. The Plan would radically boost Soviet economic output, 
and especially in heavy industry and defence. The later collectivisation of agriculture, 
formally begun in November 1929, sanctioned widespread state grain requisitions 
from the peasantry and the reorganisation of their lands to fuel breakneck economic 
growth. Stalin would forever transform the Soviet Union through this radical 
programme of state expansion.  
 Scholars have pointed to a combination of motivations behind the launch of 
industrialisation and collectivisation. These include a growing conviction among the 
Soviet leadership that the New Economic Policy was not delivering sufficient levels 
of economic growth in the late 1920s; to highlighting the poor harvests between 1927 
and 1928 that encouraged greater state control over the market; to the leadership’s 
basic ideological conviction that building socialism necessitated a large state-owned 
industry. The perception of a threatening international situation in the late 1920s was 
also a powerful motivation and has been highlighted as such in the literature.89 This 
article argues more specifically that the long-standing perceived threat from Poland is 
underestimated as a key influence on the Stalinist regime’s growing belief that 
industrialisation and collectivisation were essential to the survival of the Soviet Union 
in future war. Indeed, as Nikolai Simonov underlined, the significance of the 1927 
war scare – of which future war against Poland was a central concern – lies in the way 
this laid bare the Soviet Union’s military and economic weaknesses, which would 
																																																								




become severe problems should the international situation suddenly worsen. This 
necessitated rapid improvements to economic and military power and a new 
relationship between the state and the peasantry (which formed the bulk of the Red 
Army and produced vital food supplies). From 1928, the Stalinist regime thus led the 
country into a ‘preparatory period for war.’90 Lennart Samuelson has similarly argued 
that while steps had already been taken to improve Soviet defence capabilities and 
that Bolshevik priorities had turned towards creating a modern defence industry 
before 1927, the war scare shaped the perception of future war from being ‘an 
ideological ‘inevitability’ to a ‘threatening reality’’, even though conflict was still not 
judged as imminent.91 
 In the year of the launch of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, Soviet diplomats 
continued to judge the possibility of war against Poland as highly credible. In January 
1928, Dmitri Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to Poland, wrote to Boris Stomoniakov 
to argue that while he believed that Piłsudski did not have a fixed plan of attack in 
mind, the latter regarded a strong army as an essential component of a strong state. 
Notably, Bogomolov likened Piłsudski to a temperamental child, who loved to play 
games with soldiers. An unexpected attack therefore could not be ruled out.92 Two 
months later when the foreign ministry received information that Piłsudski was 
considering promoting Stanisław Patek as head of the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and in turn removing August Zaleski, this generated further apprehension. 
For Stomoniakov, Zaleski had been a restraining force on Piłsudski, holding him back 
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from impulsive actions. His removal would be viewed as evidence of growing 
militarism in Poland (though on the other hand, Stomoniakov also noted that the 
Polish government was still seeking a sizeable loan from the United States, which 
would dissuade it from impulsive military action).93 Even so, Poland remained seen as 
a direct military threat in 1928 and was discussed as such by the Politburo in April.94  
Stomoniakov then wrote to Bogomolov in May on the Polish military threat in 
reference to apparently trustworthy information purporting to show that the Polish 
government saw declaration of Western Ukraine as an independent republic, and its 
inclusion in federation with Poland, as a step towards future war. This development 
would apparently be supported by Winston Churchill, whose anti-communist beliefs 
the Bolsheviks were keenly aware.95 One month later, Bogomolov wrote to the NKID 
Collegium on this point: ‘If Poland decides on a military adventure against us, it will 
be carried out under the slogan of ‘freedom’ for Ukraine, and for this, she must first 
create and strengthen her Ukrainian rear in Western Ukraine.’96 The potential threat to 
Ukraine was reiterated by the Foreign Department of the OGPU later in August. In a 
report sent to the senior party leadership, the OGPU argued that Piłsudski’s primary 
goal was the seizure of Ukraine and that an attack was being prepared. Once again it 
was the British who would apparently simultaneously carry out a naval blockade.97 As 
had been true during the 1919-1920 Soviet-Polish War, Ukraine was still regarded the 
vulnerable point where an attack would come.   
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While Stalin remained convinced that war was not imminent, during 1928 his 
mind, along with other senior Bolsheviks, had turned towards the building up of 
reserves in the Soviet Union. In a speech given to the July 1928 Plenum of the Central 
Committee, Stalin directly referred to possible war against Poland and the need for 
additional grain reserves:  
 
First, we are not guaranteed against military attack. Do you think it is possible 
to defend the country, not having any reserves of bread for the army?...Can 
we, in the event of an attack by our enemies carry out a war with the Poles at 
the front and with men in the rear for the sake of getting an emergency supply 
of bread for the army? No, we cannot and should not. To defend the country, 
we must have known reserves to supply the army, at least for the first six 
months.98  
 
The 1928 harvest, however, like the crop of the previous year, was poor, magnifying a 
growing grain crisis and food supply problem.99 The interlinked dangers of war – 
primarily foreseen against Poland – and declining agricultural yields concentrated 
minds on pushing through the grain requisitions that would lead to collectivisation. 
 Two years later in 1930 Stalin now saw the military threat from Poland in 
more pressing terms. He ordered Tukhachevskii to plan for war and in a letter to 
Molotov from September argued that Poland was putting together a coalition with the 
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Baltic States which threatened Leningrad and right-bank Ukraine. Military reserves 
needed to be increased and ‘considerable funds’ set aside to ensure Soviet victory. 
Stalin suggested such funds could be found in increased vodka production.100 One 
month later, and after receiving interrogation transcripts from the OGPU investigation 
into the so-called Industrial Party, a group accused of carrying out espionage and 
sabotage, Stalin questioned political police head, Viacheslav Menzhinskii, as to why 
the 1930 intervention had not yet occurred. The timing of an intervention had featured 
in the testimony of one Professor Leonid Ramzin and Stalin demanded that this be a 
focus of questions in future interrogations, particularly why the intervention in 1930 
had been postponed and whether this was because neither Poland nor Romania were 
ready to attack. With this information, Stalin believed it was possible to run a 
Comintern campaign to ‘head off the interventionists for one to two years’.101 As it 
had been true in the past, Stalin’s strategy was to play for time.    
Alongside providing momentum behind the first Five-Year Plan and the 
collectivisation drive, the perceived military threat from Poland, and especially to 
Ukraine and the western borderlands, encouraged a surge in repression on the ground. 
As shown above, the regime had for a long time made connections between the 
dangers of sabotage and subversion and preparations for an invasion of the Soviet 
Union. And before Stalin’s attentions fell on the investigation into the Industrial Party 
in 1930, these same connections were made during the high-profile Shakhty case of 
1928. In March of that year, Genrikh Iagoda made clear to Stalin that an associated 
counterrevolutionary organisation to the Shakhty conspirators had been operating in 
Don Basin Coal Administration and directed from Poland and Germany. Its activity 
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was supposedly tied to a future military intervention.102 Then at a plenum of the 
Central Committee in April 1928, Aleksei Rykov ‘fully confirmed’ a connection 
between the Shakhty case and Polish intelligence.103 One year on from the Shakhty 
case, the OGPU launched a similar investigation into the so-called Union for the 
Liberation of Ukraine, an organisation it claimed was closely linked to Petliurite 
groups supposedly planning uprisings to assist a Polish intervention. The culmination 
was a show trial of predominately Ukrainian intellectuals.104 
Ukraine suffered devastating consequences from the connections increasingly 
drawn between internal subversion and a forthcoming invasion. As we have seen, 
since the Soviet-Polish War, the Bolsheviks saw the republic as a focal point for 
subversives of various kinds and as the point where a new Polish attack would come. 
It remained at the centre of political police attentions for this reason. In 1930, the year 
during which Stalin’s mind was fixed on a possible war against Poland and a coalition 
of border states, the OGPU conducted widespread searches and arrests in Ukraine of 
groups supposedly with connections to Poland.12,000 people were arrested across the 
year and accused of belonging to counterrevolutionary groups and preparing ‘armed 
revolution’.105 Further cases of Polish espionage were recorded. The threat of Polish 
intervention was a prominent theme in OGPU reports on local counterrevolutionary 
organisations throughout 1930 and 1932.106 
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The OGPU also escalated the nature of its operations from 1930. In March, the 
border zones of right-bank Ukraine and Belorussia were purged of supposed spies, 
kulaks and counterrevolutionaries. Those of Polish nationality were targeted.107 A 
central reason behind this repression were concerns that ‘kulak disturbances’ might 
encourage a Polish intervention and that counterrevolutionary kulak groups – carrying 
out espionage and subversion – were trying to ensure its success and the separation of 
Ukraine from the Soviet Union.108 As shown at the outset of this article, this threat 
remained at the forefront of Stalin’s mind, who complained to Kaganovich about the 
possibility of losing Ukraine to Poland in August 1932. At the end of that year, 
Vsevolod Balitskii, head of the Ukrainian GPU, reported to Stalin about the existence 
of a ‘widespread Polish-Petliurite insurgent underground’ in Ukraine, which Stalin 
then had circulated among the party leadership.109 Further cleansing operations of the 
western borders soon followed in March 1933, supposedly revealing 
counterrevolutionary groups organised by the Polish and Finnish general staffs and 
operating in strategic positions, such as railroad junctions and defence installations.110 
In July 1933, Balitskii again reported to Stalin on the subversive operations against 
the POV in Ukraine, the central organisation in these supposed conspiracies, showing 
the long-lasting imprint of this perceived subversive threat.111 Indeed, operations 
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against the POV would continue into 1934.112 Tens of thousands of Poles and 
Germans were later sent away from the border regions to Central Asia in 1935 in a 
further round of deportations.113 
 At the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1934, 
Balitskii proclaimed that a dangerous bloc of Ukrainian nationalists, backed by 
German and Polish fascism, had been crushed.  Yet according to him, the separation 
of Ukraine from the Soviet Union remained the goal of Ukrainian 
counterrevolutionary groups, which saw the republic as a bridgehead ‘on which the 
struggle against the Soviet government will develop’.114 In this way, despite the 
upsurge in state violence and mass deportations carried out on the ground in the early 
1930s, Ukraine maintained its status as a vulnerable republic. This view was fuelled 
by the sudden and widespread popular backlash against grain requisitions and 
collectivisation from the late 1920s, but it was also a consequence of a perception of 
sustained Polish subversive and military threats stretching back ten years to the Soviet 
loss of the 1919-20 war. The threat of a new war reared its head on regular occasions 
in the 1920s and the Soviet leadership saw a perpetual Polish subversive threat to the 
western border regions. And from the competing voices that tried to assess the nature 
of the true danger from Poland – from the foreign ministry, military intelligence and 
political police – Stalin’s view by the end of the 1920s was centred on war with 
capitalism being inevitable, if not in the imminent future, and that Poland was a direct 
military threat. This not only required the Soviet Union to quickly build its grain 
reserves but also strengthen its military power for the future war, giving further 
weight to the decision to turn away from NEP and towards industrialisation and 
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collectivisation. At the same time, the perceived threat to the western regions from 
Polish subversion led the OGPU to dramatically escalate its operations, opening the 
way for the use of mass deportations, methods that would be deployed again more 
lethally during the late 1930s.  
The loss of the Soviet-Polish War was therefore not an event that moderated 
the early Bolshevik regime in any meaningful sense. The reverse was true. The 
stunning loss of this conflict in 1920, and the manner in which the Bolsheviks then 
interpreted Soviet-Polish relations in the context of what they saw as capitalist 
encirclement and anticipated future war, was a key factor in encouraging the 
transformation of the state through industrialisation and collectivisation and the use of 
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